The concept of space shuttle as an economical access to space was hovering in the mind of scientist, engineers and bureaucrat from the early stages of space program. In February, 1967, the President's Science Advisory Committee lent weight to the idea of a reusable spacecraft by recommending that studies be made "of more economical ferrying systems, presumably involving partial or total recovery and use."
In August, 1972, NASA awarded a contract to Rockwell International Corporation's Space Transportation Systems Division for design and development of the Space Shuttle Orbiter. Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace was assigned development and fabrication of the External Tank, Morton Thiokol Corporation was awarded the contract for the Solid Rocket Boosters, and Rocketdyne, a division of Rockwell, was selected to develop the Orbiter main engines [1].
By early 1981, Challenger was ready for a first orbital flight program. After completing the four orbital test programs in mid- 1983, NASA began the “operational phase” for orbiter Challenger.
Challenger completed nine missions before breaking apart 73 seconds after the launch of its tenth mission, on January 28, 1986 at 11:38:00 a.m. EST, resulting in the death of seven crew members. The news grieved millions who witnessed the tragedy and in early February, President Reagan created a commission, headed by former Attorney General William P. Rogers, to investigate the disaster. “Roger Commission” as it was called was to submit a report to the President that established the probable causes of the technical failure. Unraveling the history of decision making and the conversations between Marshall and Thiokol about the SRB’s (Solid Rocket Boosters), the Commission concluded that the reasons for the Challenger launch failure were: production pressures and management wrongdoing.
In my opinion the Commission did justice by giving a holistic picture that lead to the launch failure. Production pressure consisted of competition and scarce resources. Due to the scare resources NASA made a deal with military. NASA would design the shuttle to meet military requirements; in return the Air Force agreed not to develop any new launch vehicles of its own and endorse the Shuttle Program to the White House and Congress. NASA compromised as the military goals were added to NASA’s original goals of excellence in space science. To make matter worse, OMB’s (the Office of Management and Budget) restricted their funds which meant that NASA could not develop the shuttle it had been planning. The allocation of funds was half of what NASA had requested. There was definitely a trade-off in the design and quality of the shuttle. The Commission reported the O-rings as the technical cause of the tragedy. There were enough evidence from the flight data, the debris of the Challenger and films suggesting that the O-rings in the aft field joint of the right SRB did not work correctly. The other important factor to contribute to the failure was the managerial pressure. NASA managers were subjected to extraordinary pressure to launch the Challenger. These managers were not oblivious to the risk involved; they were engineers and understood thoroughly both the technical and managerial issues involved. They knowingly violated safety requirements, risking lives to the interest of securing resources for their organization’s well being. Pressure from press and government became central to the conventional explanation of the tragedy.
“Man will continue his conquest of space. To reach out for new goals and ever greater achievements -- that is the way we shall commemorate our seven Challenger heroes.” President Ronald Reagan.
References:
[1] Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep
